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Abstract 
Background: This article reports the exploratory development and study efforts regarding the viability of a novel 
“going-in light” or “Going Light” medical component in support of US Army Pacific (USARPAC) Humanitarian Assis-
tance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions, namely, a BLU-MED® incremental modular equipment package along with a 
Rapid Deployment Medical Team (RDMT). The study was conducted to uncover a way for the U.S. Army to: (1) better 
medically support the greater U.S. military Pacific Command, (2) prepare the Army for Pacific HA/DR contingencies, 
and (3) imprint a swift presence and positive contribution to Pacific HA/DR operations.
Methods: The findings were derived from an intensive quasi-Military Decision Making Planning (MDMP) process, 
specifically, the Oracle Delphi. This process was used to: (1) review a needs assessment on the profile of disasters in 
general and the Pacific in particular and (2) critically examine the viability and issues surrounding a Pacific HA/DR 
medical response of going in light and incrementally.
Results: The Pacific area of operations contains 9 of 15 countries most at risk for disasters in the most disaster-prone 
region of the world. So, it is not a matter of whether a major, potentially large-scale lethal disaster will occur but rather 
when. Solid empirical research has shown that by every outcome measured Joint Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines) medical HA/DR operations have been inordinately successful and cost-effective when they employed U.S. 
Army medical assets inland near disasters’ kinetic impact and combined sister services’ logistical support and exper-
tise. In this regard, USARPAC has the potential to go in light and successfully fill a vital HA/DR medical response gap 
with the RDMT and a BLU-MED®. However, initially going in fast and light and expanding and contracting as the situa-
tion dictates comes with subsequent challenges as briefly described herein that must be addressed.
Conclusions: The challenges to going in light are not insurmountable “show stoppers.” They can be identified and 
addressed through planning and preparation. Hopefully, the acquisition rapid response light components will equip 
commanders with more effective options with which to conduct Pacific HA/DR operations and be a focal point for 
effective joint operations.
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Background
According to a recent comprehensive United Nations 
(UN) 30-year retrospective study, the U.S. military’s 
Pacific Command (PACOM) region is one of the more, 
if not the most, disaster-prone areas in the world [1]. 
It encompasses 50% of the Earth’s surface and popu-
lation and 10 of its largest militaries and is largely cov-
ered by water and sub-tropical coastal and mountainous 
remote interiors, with one of the Earth’s most massive 
shifting tectonic plates. It also hosts some of the most 
populous areas with rapid population growth, urbaniza-
tion, and unrestrained expanding industry and increas-
ingly crowded sea and land transit lines at high risk for 
large-scale manmade disasters [2, 3]. Not only are pure 
large-scale natural and manmade disasters likely, but 
substantial populations are concentrated astride areas 
that are predisposed to natural disasters with the poten-
tial for industrial disaster sequelae (e.g., earthquake/tsu-
nami Fukushima nuclear meltdown). The Pacific region 
is extremely active and volatile seismically, meteorologi-
cally, volcanically, geologically, and industrially, especially 
with recent climate changes [4]. Disasters of epic propor-
tions are not matters of if, but when, where, what, and 
how best to respond [5].
The UN’s Pacific Disaster report [1–6] provided an epi-
demiology of past disasters in the Pacific area that can be 
a fair predictor of future events and likely provides a road 
map on how best to respond.
First, natural disasters in PACOM will be one or more 
of four types: flood, storm, earthquake/tsunami, and 
landslide. They will likely occur westward and at some 
distance from the U.S. in Southwestern Asia, Southeast-
ern Asia, or Northwestern Asia, with the most prone 
to disasters being Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu, Bangladesh, Brunei/Darussalam, Indone-
sia–Malaysia, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Poorer 
nations and peoples without the means to respond effec-
tively will be disadvantageously affected. Second, loss of 
life and injury will be highest in earthquakes/tsunamis, 
storms, and floods. Third, survivable injuries will be 
trauma, though the major medical event will be asphyxi-
ation. Thus, the medical surgical specialties needed will 
be trauma surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, and neuro-
surgeons, as well as nursing staff and support equip-
ment. Fourth, reducing the number of deaths means 
getting medical “boots on the ground” nearest the epi-
center of disasters’ maximum kinetic energy before the 
injured there die of survivable injuries. The epicenters 
will be inland from coastlines, airports, and seaports. 
Fifth, though all nations in the region have a disaster 
response plan, research suggests initially a U.S. joint mili-
tary response will be the only viable and capable mecha-
nism for delivering needed medical treatment quickly 
[7]—though this does not preclude other nation’s from 
sending HA/DR teams too. Sixth, transportation routes 
for patients and access routes for supplies will be com-
promised and all resources will have to be imported.
Thus, a short-notice (< 24 h) self-contained, pre-posi-
tioned westward trauma operating room structure with 
medical personnel that can also accommodate routine 
care is needed for immediate deployment. This structure 
should be integrated and interoperable seamlessly with 
civilian disaster response.
Research shows, particularly for Pacific area disas-
ters, that emergency medical disaster relief: (1) must be 
able to quickly (no later than 72  h max) move and be 
fully operable proximate to epicenters where the great-
est kinetic energy of a disaster occurred, but the quicker 
the better, (2) consist primarily of acute trauma and rou-
tine medical treatment, behavioral healthcare, some OB/
PEDs capability, and, if needed, (3) be able to stabilize 
and transfer patients to higher levels of care [8–12]. Dis-
aster relief must be <72  h post-request (but the sooner 
the better) for help or it likely becomes part of the prob-
lem (e.g., “in the way” or “a bottleneck”) [13, 14] An eval-
uation of the Pakistan earthquake revealed that not 1 of 
the 43 field hospitals arrived early enough, and they cre-
ated a traffic jam when they all finally arrived at the same 
time [15]. Furthermore, everyone failed to bring the right 
kind of capabilities at the right time, including the U.S. 
military. Though the consensus on the Nepal disaster is 
still in progress, it would appear the more recent HA/DR 
responses repeated similar errors as in the past but to a 
lesser degree [16–21]. If anything, the Nepal experiences 
support the notion that the ability to quickly transport 
essential medical equipment and healthcare personnel 
to the nation’s interior were crucial to providing critical 
medical treatment [19, 20].
Conclusion: Emergency relief needs to be appropriate, 
rapid/immediate, and adaptable to the changing situation 
and augment existing hospital systems [15, 22–25]. Given 
a disaster has not made requesting help impossible, 
emergency disaster relief must be solicited by the nation 
in which the disaster occurred. But after that request has 
been received, disaster relief must come almost immedi-
ately; therefore, military contingencies must be prepared 
in advance for on-call service [26–29].
These efforts must be adaptable/scalable (i.e., modular) 
to conform to the unfolding situation and interoperable 
with local practitioners and existing higher level health/
hospital infrastructures still operable or regaining oper-
ability in the area/region [27, 28]. Even though local 
medical infrastructure will be compromised, many local 
skilled medical practitioners will be available [25].
Sixty-five percent of disaster patient care will occur 
in remote/field areas not near air or sea ports [22]. 
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Additionally, despite where disasters occur, inland or 
coastland, local health agencies, clinics, and hospitals will 
initially be compromised and overwhelmed but will be 
rebuilding. So, what is needed is an immediate surge of 
support and resources for the interim [13, 14].
Medical events will include lacerations, contusions, 
blunt force trauma, fractures, internal injuries, punc-
tures, burns, asphyxiations, amputations, and obstet-
ric complications [11] and births [10, 13, 14, 23, 24, 27]. 
Wound cleaning and dressing constitutes the majority 
of needs. Fifteen to twenty percent of patients will be 
emergent surgical and the majority will require routine 
care [8, 14] There is minimal need for preventive medi-
cine; immediate post-disaster risk of infectious disease 
epidemics is over-exaggerated, though there is a need 
for prudent preventive medicine monitoring [29]. Nev-
ertheless, long-term post-disaster preventive medicine 
is important to strengthening partnerships and alliances, 
providing security, and demonstrating the U.S. resolve 
to protect its interests in the region [30, 31]. It should be 
seamlessly woven into a gentle follow-on post-disaster 
transition.
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) is a 
cornerstone of the U.S. military’s Pacific strategy which: 
(1) focuses on strengthening alliances and partnerships, 
(2) provides assurance of U.S. security commitment to 
the region, and (3) effectively communicates the U.S. 
resolve to protect its interests and ensure that the region 
remains stable and secure [6, 7, 30, 31]. The U.S. mili-
tary’s global health engagements in the region support 
security and stability by building the capacity of military 
and civilian health systems to respond to disasters and 
health emergencies at the local, national, regional, and 
global levels [32]. Undoubtedly, disasters can provoke 
instability in any region. Therefore, U.S. military per-
sonnel stationed in PACOM have the ability to forward 
presence and crisis respond in terms of an array of con-
tingencies, including humanitarian and medical assis-
tance in response to a disaster [33]. Though the number 
of U.S. military responses to disasters in the region has 
been relatively small (<6%), each service must have the 
capability to effect a rapid medical response.
The U.S. Army through the U.S. Army Pacific (USAR-
PAC) has the potential and is experienced in far-forward 
deployment in rugged and remote areas where the epi-
center of a disaster is most likely to have occurred and 
its impact felt, during a time when an affected nation’s 
infrastructure is compromised [30]. The Army previously 
has relied on a “going-in heavy” strategy of methodi-
cally cobbling together large-scale teams and Medical 
Emergency Units (MEUs) or Combat Support Hospitals 
(CASHs), which are extremely bulky, hard-to-transport, 
self-contained units with operating and recovery rooms 
and patient wards [6, 15, 30, 32, 33]. Despite recent rapid 
advances in lighter, more modern, sturdier, and more 
mobile medical facilities and technologies, to date, the 
Army, in particular, USARPAC, has not had any in its 
inventory in terms of rapid HA/DR response. The clas-
sic doctrine for military operations for war is the use of 
methodical overwhelming force at the point of a center of 
gravity [34–36].
However, HA/DR operations doctrine stipulates that 
the proper approach is rapid response and initially a 
minimal footprint aimed at providing assistance and res-
pite establishing a foundation for possible augmentation 
until local infrastructure can become operational again 
[22–24]. Past HA/DR medical operations (e.g., Paki-
stan earthquake) were large, and therefore cumbersome, 
ineffective, and costly, and became part of the problem 
instead of remedying it [13, 14] Thus, because the U.S. 
Army Pacific has been tasked with planning and pre-
paring for HA/DR emergency medical operations, it has 
been exploring and developing its own particular alter-
native version of “going-in light” or “Going Light” that is 
fully integrate-able with its sister services in Joint Forces 
operations—generic but adaptable according to the spe-
cific situation.
Therefore, given the importance of this matter in terms 
of U.S. strategic interests and PACOM mission accom-
plishment, the intent of this article is to provide a report 
on study efforts to formulate a course of action, spe-
cifically, a viable, realistic, effective, relevant, PACOM/
USARPAC, light-weight, highly mobile, and adaptably 
modular Rapid Emergency Medical Response capabil-
ity. In so doing, this report will focus on equipment and 
personnel issues and then touch on ancillary aspects for 
further consideration. Hopefully, this report will serve as 
one crucial step forward toward achieving this as a Joint 
Forces/USARPAC capability.
Methods
The Aim of the study efforts reported here in was to 
develop equipment and personnel relevant to the U.S. 
Army strategy of “going in light” regarding disaster relief 
in its Pacific Theater of Operations. To achieve this aim, 
the Oracle Delphi [37–39] process was the study method 
used to derive the information contained in this report. 
Although this process is not the preferred Military Deci-
sion Making Process (MDMP), when formulating pro-
spective military plans and operations, the method 
includes desirable features of the MDMP in that group 
judgments and input are more valid than individual judg-
ments [39]. This also compensates for shortfalls of other 
more isolated methods where precise prediction has yet 
to be established. For the study reported herein, a prelim-
inary concept brief was initially compiled. This then was 
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circulated among 10 different USARPAC Medical Plans 
and Operations subject matter experts, each with a dif-
ferent specialization area regarding Army medical opera-
tions in PACOM. Each expert anonymously reviewed the 
original product and provided written opinions. This was 
repeated until a general consensus was reached. Ano-
nymity was preserved to prevent authorities, person-
alities, and reputations from dominating or biasing the 
process, to permit unfettered opinions and open critique, 
and to facilitate admission of errors and reformulation.
Results/discussion
Disaster “ground rules” govern the requirements for any 
USARPAC rapid deployment medical response for an 
HA/DR situation. These rules dictate that the unit be 
responsive, portable, and modular for “plug-in-and-play.” 
Specifically, it should have the built-in capacity to bal-
ance personnel and equipment on the spot in response to 
situational contingencies. Including the time needed to 
arrive on scene and become fully operational, it should be 
off-the-shelf, that is, rapidly delivered, placed, and oper-
ating (boots on the ground <72  h from alert and <24  h 
on order). Otherwise, it becomes part of the problem. 
It needs to be scalable, either up or down—up for long-
term and down for short-term missions—and able to 
provide at least a Level 1 and 2 care facility. Also, it must 
add value to other sister services as part of Joint Forces 
capabilities.
Commercial off‑the‑shelf package and an HA/DR special 
team
The aforementioned limitations, complexities, and de-
conflictions lead the Study Group to support a radi-
cal (i.e., hybrid/“outside the box”) alternative course of 
action and then iteratively consider and explore/develop 
its potential viability. Specifically, the Study Group 
floated the idea of a commercial off-the-shelf compact 
equipment package stored and maintained in Hawaii and 
staffed from Medical Command (MEDCOM) Regional 
Health Command Pacific, preferentially, Tripler U.S. 
Army Medical Center. Just such a forward pre-posi-
tioned, pre-package (i.e., “hospital in a box”—or rather 
two boxes) can be purchased from BLU-MED® Response 
Systems (see Figs.  1, 2, 3), which provides 4- to 25-bed 
facilities.
The facilities BLU-MED® offers are fully equipped 
mobile, portable, flexible/modular medical treatment 
facilities for United Nations and other peacekeeping 
medical treatment operations.
BLU-MED® is also the only provider of such systems. 
Its systems are 100% portable, compact, and permit 
multi-transportation options. A small team of Soldiers 
can easily and rapidly assemble them (“snap together”) 
‘in a couple of hours’ with minimal training provided 
by BLU-MED®. They have been used by the United 
Nations and Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion in situations similar to HA/DR (e.g., Ebola in West 
Africa) with great reviews [40]. They allow for flexible 
configuration and are scalable in response to either 
expanding or diminishing situations. They are far 
lighter and more durable than the classic Army MEU 
(“conex”) or even CASH. The BLU-MED® modules 
that were considered optimal for a U.S. Army immedi-
ate response capability (<24  h “boots on the ground” 
fully operational) were: 4-bed facility, Role II+ (−) 
Care. 1 ICU. 3 ICWs, 1 OR Beds, and/or depending on 
the extent of the situation, 10-bed facility, Role II+ (−) 
Care, 2 ICU, 8 ICW, 1 OR Beds, PLX, CP (see Figs. 2, 
3).
An extension of a 10-bed facility can be added for 
temporary housing for troops. Thus, a 25-bed facility 
would cost approximately the same as the 10-bed facil-
ity. Also, the modularity of the systems permits separat-
ing the medical treatment sets from the tent units and 
leaving the tents behind in case there is an available 
existing and non-compromised structure (e.g., school, 
church, government building) near a disaster’s epicenter 
in which to conduct medical treatment. But the modu-
lar tents provide an option to avoiding becoming victim 
to structures prone to immediate post-disaster hazards 
and “ripple effects, for example, earthquake aftershocks. 
Whatever the case, this feature upholds two paramount 
tenets of immediate disaster response, which are to use 
available infrastructure first and going in light but effec-
tive [41–43].
This system and its proposed personnel staffing con-
form to the disaster management principal of mini-
malism, specifically, minimizing the intrusiveness and 
imposition (i.e., “footprint”) of disaster relief and deliver-
ing the right amounts at the right time and increments/
decrements in response to the unfolding situation. The 
staffing recommendation is equally light depending on 
the size of the BLU-MED® system (see Tables 1 and 2). 
“Going in light” also means substantial “dual hatted” roles 
(i.e., “double tapping”), for example, personnel will have 
to cover down on both pre- and post-op, thus they must 
have trauma experience. And since it is “going in light” 
the expectation is that it is not designed for long-term/
indefinite continuous operations without substantial aug-
mentation and relief.
The primary staffing source would be Tripler Army 
Medical Center—pre-identified and tasked by name with 
a special Medical Occupational Specialty (MOS) training 
identifier as HA/DR qualified. Some will be “dual-hatted” 
in terms of medical specialization: Phase 1 Facility 13–15 
Personnel (PAX) and Phase 2 Facility 19–25 PAX.
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Fig. 1 BLU-MED® response systems mobile medical facility
Fig. 2 Phase 1 4-bed facility
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Manning and the manning process would draw on the 
Special Medical Response Command-Pubic Health Per-
sonnel Capabilities Model [43]. That is, it would be capa-
ble of deploying all year round to respond to and assist in 
humanitarian disasters, both regional and domestic. An 
initial liaison/coordinating element (a Rapid Response 
Officer) would be established within 12  h of being 
alerted. Tailored to situation requirements, particular 
specialists would be deployed within a minimum of 24 h 
and a maximum of 72 h of being alerted. Personnel would 
Fig. 3 Phase 2 10-bed facility [Dental would be excluded as this is typically not part of Disaster Relief missions. Omitting Dental also drops the price 
of the package substantially such that the price of a 25 bed facility is the same as a 10 bed facility ($1.6 million)]
Table 1 Staffing requirements 4 bed facility
If there is a need for Preventive Medicine personnel, they will be TACON and 
OPCON to the Teams, but ADCON to a higher Command Level. Research shows 
that Preventive Med is needed more Pre-and-Post Disaster
The Numbers/Letters are U.S. Army (Medical) Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) designations denoted by their respective corresponding job title
1 X  61 J General Surgeon w/Trauma experience
1 X  61 M Orthopedic Surgeon
1 X 66F Nurse Anesthetist
1 X 68Q Pharmacy Specialist
1 X 66S Critical Care Nurse w/behavioral health experience
1 X 66H Medical Surgical Nurse/Trauma experience
1 X 68D OR Tech
1 X 66P Family Nurse Practitioner w/behavioral health experience
1 X 68C Practical Nursing Specialist
2 X 68 W Health Care Specialists one dual-hatted for supply
1 X 68P Radiology Specialist
1 X 68 K Laboratory Specialist
13 Total
Possibly expanded to 15 with other specialties per mission requirements
Table 2 Staffing requirements 10 bed facility*
1 X  61 J General Surgeon w/Trauma experience
1 X 61 M Orthopedic Surgeon
1 X 70H Planning, Admin, OIC, and dual-hatted PAO
1 X 66F Nurse Anesthetist
1 X 68Q Pharmacy Specialist
2 X 66S Critical Care Nurse w/behavioral health experience
1 X 66H Medical Surgical Nurse/trauma experience
2 X 68D OR Tech
1 X 66P Family Nurse Practitioner w/behavioral health experience
2 X 68C Practical Nursing Specialist
4 X 68 W Health Care Specialists one dual hatted for supply
1 X 68P Radiology Specialist
1 X 68 K Laboratory Specialist
19 Total
Possibly expanded to 25 other specialties per mission requirements
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be capable of self-sustaining for up to 72 h with organic 
equipment, supplies, and meals without any re-supply 
from other units or organizations. Sustainment support 
would be required for austere-environment deployments 
after the 72-h initial window.
The Rapid Disaster Medical Response Team (RDMT) 
and BLU-MED® would be co-located at or near Tripler 
Army Medical Center in Hawaii for forward position-
ing, easy mobilization, and proximity to sister services 
for quick transport. The Study Group conceived of the 
RDMT with BLU-MED® as a “quick grab-it-and-go first 
aid” or “band-aide stop-gap” approach to HA/DR disas-
ter relief until: (1) an actual on-the-scene assessment of 
the situation can be conducted and a decision rendered 
regarding mission expansion or (2) the local medical 
treatment infrastructure comes back on line. Neverthe-
less, BLU-MED® can also provide equipment which local 
health providers can use.
However, this “Going in Light” option is not a panacea 
without dependencies and limitations, such as trans-
portation, material handling equipment, sustainment, 
maintenance (general/biomedical), pharmaceuticals, and 
assemblage training and ancillary considerations.
Transportation
This system and its personnel will need a ride to and from 
wherever it is they are going. If medical evacuation and 
transport are involved, then there needs to be ground 
transportation and a nearby airfield. Also, in and around 
transportation will be needed.
Material handling equipment
As light and mobile as the equipment is, it still is heavy 
enough to require heavy equipment to move it. Naturally, 
equipment must be pre-arranged (i.e., pre-packed) for 
easy deployment to the area of operations.
Sustainment
These systems and eventually personnel will need logisti-
cal support and to be tied into a logistical re-supply line 
(Class I, III, VIII). Patients will need sustainment sup-
port as well. Note that the generators are lightweight but 
this also means more of them are needed and each is a 
relatively substantial fuel consumer (3–4 gallons per hour 
per generator). So, substantial fuel re-supply and storage 
must be available. However, the fact these power systems 
are self-contained means they are not dependent on local 
power sources, which might be compromised anyway 
and just as likely not suitable for U.S. equipment.
Maintenance (general/biomedical)
Whether stored in a warehouse in Hawaii or deployed to 
an actual disaster epicenter, eventually, the systems must 
be maintained and/or reconstituted. The question always 
is who will be responsible for maintenance and funding 
maintenance.
Pharmaceuticals
No off-the-shelf equipment systems come with either 
pharmaceuticals or respiratory gases. These are added 
expenses. Note that the disaster pharmaceutical surgical 
and routine medical treatment sets are also an added 
expense. BLU-MED® does not provide those as part of its 
BLU-MED® packages. However, they are reasonably 
inexpensive and easily obtained through the Tripler U.S. 
Army Medical Supply system (30 days’ supply of routine 
treatment <$50,000 and surgical treatment <$5000).1 
However, the surgical drug sets contain substantial 
amounts of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)-
scheduled medications that must be monitored and con-
trolled. Both sets can be packaged and available for 
pickup from Tripler within 24 h of alert/request.
Assemblage training
Also, ongoing assemblage training is necessary. As part 
of the acquisition package, BLU-MED® provides only a 
one-time assembly training session. After that, it would 
be the responsibility of the HA/DR Rapid Response Team 
to pass down the BLU-MED® assembly training to new 
members by conducting regular assemblage training. 
Alternatively, this training would have to be contracted 
from BLU-MED® at an additional expense. Training 
events where the BLU-MED® is taken off the shelf and 
put into simulated action also could be opportunities to 
practice and coordinate with possible host nations and 
regional militaries (e.g., National Guard State Partner-
ships) [44] and HA/DR civilian officials. Furthermore, 
this would also dispel a possible criticism, that is, if the 
U.S. Military only responds to 6% of the disasters in the 
region, its acquisition hardly justifies the investment 
however small.
Other ancillary considerations
Also, other ancillary considerations must be considered 
in terms of the viability of the BLU-MED®/RDMT option 
but these would be incumbent on any HA/DR emergency 
medical operation, whether BLU-MED® is employed or 
not. Security force protection will be needed and can 
be provided by the enlisted Soldier Emergency Medi-
cal Technicians (EMTs-68Ws). However, this should be 
tasked to security specialists (e.g., U.S. Marines or Air 
Force Security Police). Just because the U.S. Army is 
there to help does not mean that its presence may not 
1 Note: Dollar amounts are as of 2016.
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afford a target of opportunity. A source for water will be 
needed though the BLU-MED® system does have a water 
purification system. There also needs to be provision for 
sanitation and waste removal. BLU-MED® has incinera-
tion capabilities for bio-waste. The BLU-MED® systems, 
though compact, when fully deployed along with trans-
portation avenues still require substantial amounts of 
real estate.
Therefore, depending on the particular disaster situ-
ation, cut-points (“Rubicon-s”; see Fig.  4) must be 
pre-established for BLU-MED® size (Phase 1 or 2), BLU-
MED® expansion (Phase 1–2), mission expansion (fol-
low-on with a complete Combat Support Hospital), or 
mission withdrawal.
Additionally, a communication (signal) system must be 
provided for voice and data. One suggestion was the use 
of contracted light-weight satellite cell phones as the mis-
sions were unclassified. Data also include the particular 
system to document medical treatment and track in- and 
out-patients and patient transport. Adequate high-speed 
electronic communications also means telemedicine 
could be employed as a force-multiplier.
Finally, the disposition of the BLU-MED® facility post-
mission must be considered. Specifically, (1) will it be 
rolled up, boxed up, and shipped back to Hawaii or (2) 
will it be left in place in the interest of local service/train-
ing and forging military-civil Pacific partnerships, or will 
some other disposal be used to avoid the inconvenience 
Disaster/Assistance Request
Kinec Epicenter 





0-24 hours: equipment and 
personnel mobilizaon  and 
MSS coordinaon
24-48 hours: travel 
to set-up site  
48-72 hours: fully 
operaonal and treang 
paents
Note: RD-HA/DR-MTF is 
designed to provide:
(1) Two opons of 0-14 
or 14-30 day buffers in 
which to mobilize 
tradional responses or 
withdraw; and, 
(2) An on-site immediate, 
effecve medical 
presence near the 
epicenter of a disaster. 
Defer to AF/NAV
= Event or milestone
= Decision Point
= Outcome
0-14 days, local medical 












building” or bring 



























Fig. 4 Tree decision model for PACOM RDMT for HA/DR
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and expense of return shipment? Donation would 
improve the medical systems near U.S. and multinational 
forces, thus fostering self-sufficiency and contributing to 
the earlier achievement of the U.S. PACOM military mis-
sion [15, 22]. However, some sensitive components such 
as controlled medications and electronics would have to 
be packed and shipped back regardless.
Conclusion
This article reported preliminary yet intensive study 
efforts aimed at formulating an “out-of-the-box” course 
of action, specifically a viable, realistic, effective, relevant, 
PACOM/USARPAC, light-weight, highly mobile, and 
adaptably modular Rapid Emergency Medical Response 
capability. In so doing, this report focused primarily on 
equipment and personnel issues and then touched briefly 
on ancillary aspects for further and more definitive con-
sideration. PACOM’s area of operations contains 9 of 15 
countries most at risk for disasters in the most disaster-
prone region of the world [31]. USARPAC is the Depart-
ment of Defense’s subject matter expert in PACOM 
on inland HA/DR operations proximate to the kinetic 
epicenter of most disasters. However, USARPAC does 
not even have a rapidly deployable Level 1 and 2 medi-
cal capability available for HA/DR relief. In conjunction 
with sister services for supply and forward projection 
and delivery systems (e.g., Blue Pathways) in Joint Forces 
operations, the Rapid Disaster Medical Response Team 
with a BLU-MED® commercial off-the-shelf package 
provides a rapid, on-the-spot, flexible, and responsive 
solution to HA/DR situational contingencies. Also, solid 
empirical research shows that this Joint Forces scenario 
has been the most successful.
Though this system is not without challenges, some 
unique to the components and system described and 
some generic to “Going in Light” disaster relief, they are 
not insurmountable “show-stoppers.” They can easily be 
identified through disaster preparation exercises, antici-
pated and addressed far in advance, and accounted for in 
operations’ planning. One other consideration in terms of 
the way forward is in the future encouraging host-nations 
prone to disaster to purchase their own BLU-MED® 
and assembling an RDMT in the interest of accessibility, 
immediacy, and inter-operability and collaboration. Nev-
ertheless, the BLU-MED®/RDMT and “going in light” is 
not a single solution/approach but one that incorporates 
development, evolution, augmentation, and incremental 
responsiveness given the unfolding situation.
Hopefully, the acquisition of the BLU-MED® and for-
mation of the RDMT will equip commanders with more 
and more effective options with which to conduct Pacific 
HA/DR operations. Also, the expectation is that this new 
USARPAC capability will be the impetus for more Joint 
Forces operations and will serve as a centerpiece for facili-
tating joint training with multi-national PACOM partner 
nations in the interest of regional stability. Future program 
evaluation should investigate its cost-effectiveness and 
deploy-ability, public relations potential, and creative ways 
in which ancillary challenges related to it can be addressed.
Abbreviations
$: American dollars; AF: Air Force; BLU-MED: medical response package/emer-
gency shelters; CASH/CSH: combat army support hospitals; Class I: rations—
subsistence (food and drinking water); Class III: petroleum, oils, lubricants; 
Class VIII: medical material (equipment and consumables); Conex: container 
express/large metal self-contained shipping container; CP: command post; 
CSS: combat service support/support services also pre-op prep area; DEA: 
Drug Enforcement Agency; DoD: (United States) Department of Defense; EMT: 
emergency medical technicians; ER: emergency room; FST: Forward Surgical 
Team; H: hour; HADR or HA/DR: Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response; 
HVAC: heating ventilation air-conditioning; HI: Hawaii; ICU: intensive care unit; 
ICW: intensive care ward; MDMP: Military Decision Making Process; MEDCOM: 
(U.S. DoD) Medical Command; MEU: medical emergency units; MOS: (U.S. 
Army) Military Occupational Specialty Codes; MTF: medical treatment facility; 
MSS: medical service supply; NAV: Navy; OR: operating room; OT: outpatient 
treatment; PACOM: (United States Department of Defense) Pacific Command; 
PAX: personnel; PLX: pharmacy/lab/X-ray; RD: paid deployment; RDMT: Rapid 
Deployment Medical Team; U.S.: United States; UN: United Nations; USARPAC: 
United States Army Pacific Area Command.
Author details
1 United States Army, Medical Operations and Planning Office, HQ, USARPAC, 
G-3 HADR, BLDG x348, Fort Shafter, HI 96858, USA. 2 1st BDE, 1 Southern Div, 
75th Trng Cmd, 10949 Aerospace Ave., Houston, TX 77034, USA. 
Acknowledgements
The Author, LTC Ralph J Johnson III, wishes to acknowledge COL Richard Paz 
for review of this manuscript and the support of US Army and USARPAC in 
its preparation and UT-MDACC for in kind support. The Author also gratefully 
thanks the following Soldiers for their involvement: LTC Jeffrey Hogue, MAJ 
Richard Floyd, MAJ Scott R. Baird, LTC Daniel Barnes, LTC Antonio Copland, LTC 
Tanthetra Joseph, MSG Rodney Chiles, SFC Kevin Cook, CPT Timothy Warner, 
and MAJ Angela Schmillen. The Author also thanks Ms. Ms. Jacqueline Ramey 
for proofing and copyediting.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army or any other organization.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Availability of data and materials
Data are available from the author requested through United States Army, 
Commander, Medical Operations and Planning Office, HQ, USARPAC, G-3 
HADR, Fort Shafter, HI, 96858, USA.
Consent to study
All study participants agreed to publication of study results in the medical 
literature without their identity prior to participation.
Received: 4 August 2016   Accepted: 27 September 2016
References
 1. UN ESCAP: Overview of natural disasters and their impacts in Asia and 
the Pacific, 1970–2014, ESACP Technical paper information paper and 
communications technology and disaster risk reduction division, 7 March 
2015. p. 1–8, 22–7.
Page 10 of 10Johnson III  Disaster and Mil Med  (2016) 2:15 
 2. UN ESCAP: Overview of natural disasters and their impacts in Asia and 
the Pacific, 1970–2014, ESCAP Technical paper information paper and 
communications technology and disaster risk reduction division, 7 March 
2015. p. 24–5.
 3. Asian Development Bank. Financial integration and capital flow volatility 
in emerging asia: issues and policies. The Philippines: Asian Development 
Bank; 2011.
 4. Asian Development Bank. Adapting to climate change: strengthening 
the climate resilience of the water sector infrastructure in Khulna, Bangla-
desh. The Philippines: Asian Development Bank; 2011.
 5. Simpson A, Cummins P, Dhu T, Griffin J, et al. Assessing natural disaster 
risk in the Asia-Pacific region. AusGeo News. 2008;90:1–6.
 6. Andrews RJ, Quintana LM. Unpredictable, unpreventable and imper-
sonal medicine: global disaster response in the 21st century. EPMA J. 
2015;6(2):1–12.
 7. Smart T. Designed for war, honed in disaster: ADF AME in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Australia defense force air medical evacuation presentation at the 
aerospace medical association annual meeting, San Diego, 2014.
 8. Awais S, Saeed A. Study of severity of musculoskeletal injuries and triage 
during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. Int Orthop. 2013;37(8):1443–7.
 9. Barboza P, Coulombier D, Defilippi L, et al. Outbreak of tetanus cases 
following the tsunami in Aceh Province, Indonesia. Glob Public Health. 
2006;1(2):173–7.
 10. Eyre A. Meeting the needs of people in emergencies: a review of UK 
experiences and capability. Emerg Health Threats J. 2008;1(e9):1–6.
 11. van Walsum AD, Rodel SG, Klaase JM, et al. Local and regional in-hospital 
trauma care following fireworks depot explosion in Enschede. Neder-
lande Tijdschr Geneeskd. 2001;145(48):2330–5.
 12. Haeri S, Marcozzi D. Emergency preparedness in obstetrics. Obstet 
Gynecol. 2015;125(4):959–70.
 13. Noe RS, Schnall AH, Wolkin AF, et al. Disaster-related injuries and illnesses 
treated by American Red Cross disaster health services during Hurricanes 
Gustav and Ike. South Med J. 2013;106(1):102–8.
 14. McIntyre T, Hughes CD, Pauyo T, et al. Emergency surgical care delivery in 
post-earthquake Haiti: partners in Health and Zanmi Lasante experience. 
World J Surg. 2011;35(4):745–50.
 15. von Schreeb J, Riddez L, Samnegard H, et al. Foreign field hospitals in 
the recent sudden-onset disasters in Iran, Haiti, Indonesia, and Pakistan. 
Prehosp Disaster Med. 2008;23(2):144–51.
 16. Asokan GV, Vanitha A. Disaster response under one health in the 
aftermath of Nepal earthquake, 2015. J Epidemiol Glob Health. 2016;. 
doi:10.1016/j.jegh.2016.03.001.
 17. Yamamoto T. Participation in relief activities in the aftermath of the Great 
Nepal earthquake and disaster reconstruction assistance. Japan Med 
Assoc J. 2015;58(3):111–3.
 18. Nielsen MJ, Ferguson S, Joshi AK, Rimal S, et al. Post-earthquake 
recovery in Nepal. Lancet Glob Health. 2016;4(3):e161. doi:10.1016/
S2214-109X(15)00279-X.
 19. Merin O, Yitzhak A, Bader T. Medicine in a disaster area: lessons from 
the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. JAMA Intern Med. 2015;175(9):1437–8. 
doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.3985.
 20. Ho ML, Lim JZ, Tan MZ, Kok WL, et al. Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief mission by a tripartite medical team led by the Singa-
pore Armed Forces after the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Singap Med J. 
2016;57(8):426–31. doi:10.11622/smedj.2016132.
 21. Basnyat B. Post-earthquake Nepal: acute-on-chronic problems. Natl Med 
J India. 2016;29(1):27.
 22. FEMA. The Federal Emergency Management Agency; 2010. p. 30–5.
 23. FEMA. FEMA Management and Support Keystones; 2011. p. 19–43.
 24. NIMS. National Incident Management System. Homeland Security; 2008. 
p. 5–7, 21.
 25. de Ville de Groyet C. Health lessons learned from the recent earthquakes 
and Tsunami in Asia. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2007;22(1):15–21.
 26. Campos-Outcalt D. Disaster medical response: maximizing your effective-
ness. J Fam Pract. 2006;55(2):113–5.
 27. Pesik N, Keim M. Logistical considerations for emergency response 
resources. Pac Health Dialogue. 2002;9(1):97–103.
 28. Yamada S, Gunatilake RP, Roytman TM, et al. The Sri Lanka tsunami experi-
ence. Disaster Manag Response. 2006;4(2):38–48.
 29. Klein KR, Pepe PE, Burkle FM Jr, et al. Evolving need for alternative triage 
management in public health emergencies: a Hurricane Katrina case 
study. Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;Suppl 1:S40–4.
 30. Moroney JD, Pezard S, Miller, LE, Engstrom J, et al. Lessons from Depart-
ment of Defense disaster relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. RAND 
Corporation, Prepared on behalf of the Department of Defense, 2013. p. 
24.
 31. Chinn CG Adm. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the 
Indo-Asian-Pacific. EMC chair conference paper. https://www.usnwc.
edu/Academics/Faculty/Derek-Reveron/Workshops/Maritime-Security,-
Seapower,—Trade-(1)/papers/chinn.aspx.
 32. Moroney JD, Pezard S, Miller, LE, Engstrom J, et al. Lessons from Depart-
ment of Defense disaster relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. RAND 
Corporation, Prepared on behalf of the Department of Defense. 2013.  
p. 41–47.
 33. Moroney JD, Pezard S, Miller, LE, Engstrom J, et al. Lessons from Depart-
ment of Defense disaster relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. RAND 
Corporation, Prepared on behalf of the Department of Defense. 2013.  
p. 39–41.
 34. Corum J. The roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seecht and German military 
reform. Lawrence: University of Kansas; 1992. p. 150–80.
 35. Johnston P. Doctrine is not enough: the effect of doctrine on behavior of 
armies. Parameters. 2000;30(3):30–9.
 36. Clausewitz CV. Chapter 1: What is war? In: Howard M, Paret P, editors 
and trans. On war, vol. 16. Princeton: Oxford University Press. 1976. p. 16, 
23–25.
 37. Rowe G, Wright G. The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and 
analysis. Int J Forecast. 1999;15:353–75.
 38. Rowe G, Wright G. Expert opinion in forecasting: role of Delphi technique. 
In: Armstrong JS, editor. Principles of forecasting: a handbook of research-
ers and practitioners. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2001.
 39. Dalkey N, Helmer O. An experimental application of the Delphi method 




 41. Wade N. BSS5: battle staff SMARTbook, 5th rev. ed. (leading, planning & 
conducting military operations). The Lightning Press, SMARTbooks; 2015.
 42. Lane DA. Medical support to Sri Lanka in the wake of tsunamis: planning 
considerations and lessons learned. Mil Med. 2006;171(10 Suppl 1):19–23.
 43. https://phc.amedd.army.mil/organization/phcrpac/Pages/SpecialMedi-
calResponseCapability-PublicHealth.aspx.
 44. http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/
International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/.
